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Canadian-American Trade Problems
in a Multilateral Context
Theodore R. Gates*
There was a lottery held for the order of speaking this morning,
and I am not sure whether it is good to win it or to lose it. As the
first speaker I intend to say things that the "real" experts on the
panel may not. I want to make some very general observations
and pass along some experiences that I, at least, feel show where
there have been mistakes in past Canadian-American relations. I
also think that I perhaps can stake a claim to some impartiality. At
least I think I am one of the few bilateral people on the panel; I
have a Canadian mother and an American father so my feelings are
mixed.
Perhaps the first thing I might do would be to give you some
impressions of the direction I think the United States and Canada
are going, largely colored by what has been going on the last two
weeks in Washington. I am merely thinking in terms of the beginnings of our American process of developing trade legislation.
You will hear a lot more this afternoon from John Jackson, although after the week he has been through he probably will not
want to talk much about it. As we look to the future there are
some things that have been going on, some problems that have
emerged, that I think are relevant.
The first impression one has in Washington these days is the
difficulty of beginning to come to grips with the legislative requirements, with the policy requirements, with the interrelationships between the trade problems and the monetary problems, with the
awesome complexities of trade barriers and the traditional problems in trade, and with the challenge of new rules and procedural
problems. Particularly, it is very difficult to strike a balance between the inherently national self-interest and the international effects of legislation. We see this now in the administration in the
formulation of a new trade bill, the Trade Reform Act of 1973,'
which tries to balance the international requirements with the domestic requirements. And we are certainly going to see more of it
* Vice President and Director, International Business and Research Corporation,
Washington, D.C.
1 H.R. 6767, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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as the United States Congress grapples with the dilemma of setting
a proper balance between the two.
I think that the obvious lesson here is that the two countries
have the same problem, that being how to balance the things that
each country feels it must do in its own self-interest with other
things that it should do in the greater interest of the future world.
A third obvious point that emerges is that it is very difficult for
any person today to really understand and grasp the central elements of any current trade problem. One comes away with the feeling, and I am glad you have experts here today, that only experts
in individual areas are really competent to understand those areas
and that for the generalist or the politician the issues often extend
quite beyond his grasp. This applies both to the details of any particular problem or any particular area and certainly to the interrelationships and the balance between them. I think it is quite clear
that at least for the time being we will all be fumbling in Washington, in Geneva, and in other capitals. We do not know the answers. We simply know we must get on with it.
If there is any light at the end of the tunnel I think it is the
rather platitudinous one that somehow we must find a new blend of
various national self-interests and domestic problems in a major determination to better understand each other and to move ahead in
a new major effort. If we do not, I think it is rather clear we are
in for fairly serious trouble. It has now been 18 months since August 15, 1971. It is very difficult, if one wants to be an optimist, to
see how the traumatic experience of that very definite ending of an
era 18 months ago has really been succeeded by a forceful and determined substantive/ effort to move ahead.2
Turning to bilateral relationships, I think Canada and the United
States have suffered too long from the perils of proximity and close
relationships. Too often the countries have looked at problems
and looked at relationships only in a bilateral context. I certainly
would say this as one who has participated in trade negotiations
with Canada.
In many major areas the United States and Canada have looked
only at each other's interests, concentrating too much on solutions
that involve only the two of them. Of course, it is a lot easier to
solve problems when there are only two sides instead of fifty sides.
.2 On August 15, 1971, the Proclamation Regarding Imposition of Supplemental Duty
for Balance of Payments Purposes was issued, whereby the United States introduced
an import surcharge of 10% on dutiable imports.
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As we have seen in committees of twenty or even ten, it is much
harder to agree.
I certainly think it fair to suggest, with all due respect, that the
Canadian trade policy in the past has been far too interested in trade
only with the United States. Obviously this stems from, as our
chairman has said, the enormous amount of trade between the two
countries. The American market is the major market for most
Canadian industries, and in past trade negotiations the principal
objective of Canada was to negotiate greater access to the American
market. In addition, there has been a tendency to maintain a tariff
structure and trade policies which are unduly protective. Even if
these practices were once justified, they are certainly no longer
appropriate, particularly now when a substantial trade surplus exists.
Some of these basic policies should now be reconsidered.
Turning to the other side of the ledger, the United States over
the last decade has been overly concerned with problems and with
countries and policies elsewhere in the world and not concerned
enough with Canada. The American preoccupation in trade with
the European community and with Japan, for example, has been
such that little concern has been given to other problems. Moreover, in recent years the United States has been caught very short
by the sudden deterioration of its trade balance. 3 As the politician or the policy expert looks at the trade deterioration he sees the
dramatic changes from the Auto Pact or our bilateral trade balance.
Recently, given the grave future problems of energy and raw material shortages, the United States in many areas has overreacted to
purely bilateral problems. At the same time, I think it is also fair
to say that over the years American trade affairs have often degenerated to minor bilateral squabbling. A list could be made of some
fairly incredible minor issues to which a great deal of time, a great
deal of diplomatic traffic, and a great deal of energy of even cabinet
level officials have been devoted in the past ten years. The list
would begin with the likes of potatoes, shoeboard and milk cans,
Many more items could be added, all being issues that were blown
out of proportion.
Thus, if I have any suggestions within the broad title of your
3 Since 1965, the United States net trade balance of payments has deteriorated badly.
Although export growth has been well maintained, import growth has soared. The
United States incurred its first deficit in this century in 1971, when exports exceeded
imports by $2 billion. In 1972, this figure worsened, with the American trade deficit
reaching $6.4 billion. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 40
(1973).
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conference, it seems to me that one of the many splendored possibilities is to move away from excessive bilateral squabbling and
preoccupation with details and to find solutions for larger problems
in a multilateral context. In world trade and monetary matters
major reforms are needed. W'e can no longer permit bilateral relationships throughout the world, formed to solve bilateral problems, to interfere with the process of solving multilateral problems
simply because the multilateral problems are difficult to understand.
Moreover, many bilateral problems can be solved in a multilateral context. One recent acrimonious issue, of course, was a
problem arising out of Canadian policy toward regional development. The finding and creating of jobs back in my mother's home
province led to the use of certain subsidies and aids. 4 Regional assistance is a common problem in many places, but unfortunately it
has also become an unlimited kind of competition. The problems
of regional development, use of subsidies, and tax differences and
tax policies which definitely impact and impinge on foreign trade,
require new international approaches.
Another major area in which the United States and Canada
have a common interest is the development of trading blocs throughout the world, but primarily in Europe, which, in effect, are developing a very broad area of discrimination against both countries.
These blocs change the very nature of world competition for both
Canada and the United States. They change the nature of the prospects of Canadian and American exports. They certainly change
political realities and, above all, from my more parochial point of
view they are going to change the negotiating realities in future efforts to settle and reach better solutions. The major countries in
Europe and the innumerable satellite countries now associated with
Europe will be negotiating and determining policies and objectives
as a unit. If the United States and Canada continue to negotiate
without an attempt to seek better coordination, each will lose a
great deal of strength.
Turning away from international problems, Canada and the
United States have many of the same domestic problems. Textiles
are a problem in the United States; they are a problem in Canada.
The footwear industry is a problem in Canada; it is a problem in
the United States. Both nations certainly share enormous problems
4 For a discussion of the use of subsidies in regional development, see Regional Development Incentives Program, 78 CANADIAN BANKER 47 (1971).
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in agriculture. 5 They face the same kind of problems in other areas.
In the forthcoming negotiations both are going to face the same
kinds of confrontations, the same kinds of tactics. Both, in certain
areas, still have excessive duties. The European community is going
to make it a number one priority to harmonize tariffs. In short, in
order to achieve the many splendored multilateral possibilities, some
of the bilateral problems must be solved. The best way to solve
them will often be in a multilateral context. And, in a multilateral
context, the most effective way of achieving both separate and
shared goals will be through far greater coordination and close
working relationships than have been achieved in the past.
5 See the statements of D. Gale Johnson and T. K. Warley, infra, for a discussion
of specific agricultural problems in the United States and Canada.

